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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
LYNN DELL NOREN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
16018 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from a jury verdict finding him 
guilty of Fraudulent Handling of a Recordable Writing in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503 (1953) , as amended. 
The charge was based on appellant's filing of articles of 
incorporation for Nordell Financial Service with the 
Secretary of State after forging two signatures upon said 
articles of incorporation. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury in the Third 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, 
presiding, on July 13, 14 and 17, 1978. Appellant was 
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convicted of violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503 (1953), 
as amended, a felony of the third degree. Pursuant to 
the verdict, Judge Croft sentenced appellant to an 
indeterminate term of from 0-5 years imprisonment in 
the Utah State Prison, and imposed a fine of $5,000.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment 
and sentence pronounced by the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the years 1974 through 1976, the appellant 
operated a used car dealership called World of Autos located 
in Salt Lake County (R.300,341,343,253). Ireva Petty 
Ozawa also participated in the operation of World of Autos 
as a bookkeeper, having herself a 50 percent interest in 
the corporation (R.294,295). In October of 1975, appellant 
employed one Raymond L. Bishop to buy cars for World of 
Autos at car auctions in several West~~n states (R.l33-135). 
Under the normal procedure followed by World of 
Autos, when Ray Bishop bought a car he instructed the 
seller to send a "draft" or envelope containing the 
title to a bank in Utah (R.l36,137). Ireva Petty Ozawa 
would then pay the price of the car to the bank, receive 
the title to the car, allowing it to be sold by World 
-2-
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of Autos (R.298-301). The bank charged World of Autos 
a fee of $15.00 per draft (T.BO). 
During 1975, World of Autos began having 
difficulty paying for cars bought for resale purposes 
(R.340-341). To ease this problem, appellant determined 
to set up his own finance company, Nordell Financial 
Services, to eliminate having to pay a bank for handling 
drafts (R.l40,30l-302). Under this arrangement, drafts 
sent to Nordell would be available to World of Autos such 
that the latter would have the title to a car and could 
re-sell the car before paying the dealer from whom World 
of Autos bought the car (R.l42). 
Appellant had Byron Fisher, a Salt Lake attorney, 
draft articles of incorporation for Nordell and approached 
Ray Bishop and appellant's mother,Fawn s. Noren, about 
being incorporators of Nordell along with Ireva Petty 
Ozawa (R.l47,212,326,247-248). Appellant did not 
want to be an incorporator of Nordell (R.260). Ray 
Bishop refused the request to become an incorporator and 
appellant's brother apparently cautioned Fawn Noren not 
to become involved (R.l47,248). 
On the 22nd of January, 1976, Ireva Petty Ozawa 
took the unsigned articles of incorporation to appellant 
at the Salt Lake Auto Auction. Without authority to do so, 
-3-
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appellant forged the signatures of Ray Bishop and Fawn 
Noren upon the articles (R.l49,193,228,311). Ireva 
Petty Ozawa then took the document to Ron Ferguson, 
signed her name to it, and Mr. Ferguson notarized it 
(R.309,177). Ms. Ozawa proceeded to file the articles 
of incorporation in the Secretary of State's Office 
(R. 312). 
Appellant told Ray Bishop to tell the dealers 
from whom he bought the cars to begin sending drafts to 
Nordell (R.l43). Bishop was also instructed by appellant 
to tell such dealers that World of Autos had been dealing 
with Nordell for a year and a half (R.l44). In addition, 
appellant represented to Kenneth Don Nelson, the manager 
of an auto auction in California, that Nordell was a 
"group of local businessmen," and when Mr. Nelson contacted 
the Secretary of State's Office to determine who incorporated 
Nordell, appellant denied any relation to Ireva Petty 
Ozawa or Fawn Noren (R.380-382). 
ARGUHENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
RULING THAT UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-503 
(1953), AS AMENDED, APPLIES TO FILING 
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION UPON WHICH 
ARE FORGED SIGNATURES. 
Appellant claims that the language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-503 (1953), as qmended (all statutory references 
-4-
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are to Utah Code Ann. unless otherwise indicated) which 
covers any " •.. other writing for which the law provides 
public records" does not encompass articles of incorpora-
tion. The crux of appellant's claim is that the law of 
Utah provides not for the "recording" but for the "filing" 
of articles of incorporation; see e.g., Section 67-2-2(4). 
Appellant argues that articles of incorporation 
are not heavily relied upon by the public, as are deeds, 
mortgages, and security instruments which are enumerated 
in Section 76-6-503, and that the legislature thus did not 
intend articles of incorporation to be encompassed within 
"writing(s) for which the law provides public recording." 
Respondent submits that the distinction between 
"recording" and "filing" is merely semantical, and carries 
no substantial significance. Appellant admits at page 8 of 
his brief that once articles of incorporation are filed, 
they become a matter of public record, in the same way as 
do deeds, mortgages, and security instruments. 
In ruling on appellant's motion to quash the 
information or to dismiss, Judge Croft discredited 
appellant's contention that articles of incorporation 
are not relied upon by the public: 
-5-
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. . . I would say that the words 
"or other writing for which the law 
requires public recording" does cover 
the filing of Articles of Incorporation 
in the Secretary of State's Office because 
the law requires those documents to be 
filed in that office and indexed so the 
public can go up there and examine them 
and find out what the history of the 
corporation 1s. What its makeup is and 
what its Articles provide, who its 
incorporators are, before that corporation 
has any legal existence. . • • 
(R.l28-129, emphasis added.) The State also produced the 
testimony of Kenneth Don Nelson, a manager of an auto 
auction in California which dealt with World of Autos, 
as to his attempt to obtain information about Nordell 
from the articles of incorproation (R.376-388). Mr. 
Nelson came to Salt Lake City to check into over $70,000 
worth of drafts sent to Nordell which had not been paid 
for (R.379-380). After being told by appellant that world 
of Autos had paid Nordell for the drafts, Mr. Nelson 
called the Secretary of State's Office and was told that 
the articles of incorporation for Nordell showed that 
Ireva Petty Ozawa and Fawn Noren were incorporators of 
Nordell (R.380,381,382). 
This conduct shows that those who dealt with 
appellant and World of Autos could and did rely on the 
articles of incorporation for Nordell Financial Services, 
-6-
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which were a matter of public record, to determine if 
Nordell and World of Autos were organized by the same 
person. In addition, Ray Bishop testified that the 
auto auction in PhQenix, Arizona, refused to send 
dra·fts to a private financial company but would deal 
only through banking institutions (R.l72). This 
would indicate a distrust on the part of the sellers of 
financial enterprises operated by the same persons who 
operated the car dealership who bought cars from the 
seller. In summary, then, articles of incorporation 
are documents relied upon by the public and for which 
the law provides public recording, and Judge Croft 
was correct in so holding. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT BOUND 
TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-504 (1953), AS 
AMENDED, BECAUSE THE SECTION DOES NOT 
CONTROL THE SAME CONDUCT AS UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-6-503 (1953), AS AMENDED. 
Appellant contends that since Section 76-6-504, 
prohibiting tampering with records, controls the same 
conduct as does Section 76-6-503, but prescribes a 
lesser penalty, the trial court should have submitted 
the case to the jury under Section 76-6-504. Conceding 
that where there are two statutes which proscribe the 
-7-
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same conduct, but impose different penalties, the 
defendant is entitled to the lesser of the two 
penalties; Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977), 
respondent submits that Section 76-6-503 and Section 
76-6-504 do not proscribe the same conduct. 
It should be noted that the argument presented 
in Point I of appellant's brief is inconsistent with 
the contention urged in Point II. In Point I, appellant 
argues that Section 76-6-503 does not cover articles of 
incorporation. In Point II, he contends that articles 
of incorporation are "within the purview" of Section 
76-6-504. Yet appellant contends that the two statutes 
proscribe the same conduct, i.e., falsify~ng, destroying, 
removing, or concealing a public record. 
Section 76-6-504 expressly excludes from its 
proscription those writings enumerated in Section 76-6-503, 
thus indicating that the conduct proscribed by the two 
statutes is not identical because it refers to different 
objects which are influenced by the conduct. It is 
also significant that Section 76-6-503 applies only to 
documents for which the law provides for public recording, 
while Section 76-6-504 applies more broadly to any record, 
public or private. Thus, this case is similar to Ramrnell 
v. Smith, supra, in which the Utah Supreme Court after 
-8-
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acknowledging the general rule, held that the two statutes 
there involved did not proscribe the same conduct. The 
trial court was correct in refusing to submit the case to 
the jury under Section 76-6-504 (R.392). 
POINT III 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-503 (1953) , 
AS AMENDED, IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
VAGUE. 
Appellant contends that the statute under which 
he was charged and convicted is unconstitutionally vague 
because it is not clear to what extent the language "other 
writing for which the law provides public recording" is 
applicable to documents not enumerated in the statute. 
The fact that the statute does not enumerate all possible 
writings for which the law provides public recording is not 
a constitutional infirmity. Under constitutional 
standards, a law is not unconstitutionally vague unless 
it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited by the 
statute. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 
U.S. 156 (1972); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 
408 (1972); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974). 
Where, as here, the benefit of commonsense under-
standing reveals the general nature of the conduct prohibited, 
-9-
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the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not require complete certainty as to the meaning of 
statutory terms. In the case of People v. Perez, 561 
P.2d 7 (Colo. 1977), the appellant challenged a statute 
under authority of which his illicit massage parlor was 
closed down as being unconstitutionally vague. In 
denying his appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado stated: 
. a statute need not be drafted 
with the greatest possible facility or 
lucidity of expression if it meets the 
minimal requirements of due process. 
Given the benefit of commonsense under-
standing of the statutory terms [citation 
omitted) the statute challenged here makes 
reasonably clear to those intended to be 
affected what conduct is within its scope. 
561 P.2d 7, 10. The Court reasoned that although the 
challenged phrase "public or private place of prostitution" 
was not defined with mathematical precision, it was not 
unfair to appellant who "deliberately chose to approach 
the area of proscribed conduct and assumed the risk 
of crossing the line." Perez, supra at p. 10. 
Several other courts, including this Court, 
have recognized that due process does not demand that 
statutes be drafted with the greatest possible exactitude. 
In United States v. Maude, 481 F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 
the Court wrote: 
-10-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is 
not a principle designed to convert into 
a constitutional dilemma the practical 
difficulties in drawing criminal statutes 
both general enough to take into account 
a variety of human conduct and sufficiently 
specific to provide fair warning that 
certain kinds of conduct are prohibitive. 
481 F.2d 1062, 1068. See also Colten v. Kentucky, 407 u.s. 
104 (1972). 
In State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 
(1952), cited by appellant, this Court also recognized 
that: 
The limitations of language are 
such that neither absolute exactitude 
nor complete precision of meaning are to 
be expected, and such standard cannot 
be required. 
250 P.2d 561, 564. Respondent submits that Section 
76-6-503 meets the minimal requirements of due process in 
that it does not force men of reasonable intelligence to 
guess what conduct is prohibited. 
Although the statute does not enumerate all 
the writings for which the law provides public recording, 
it does give examples. As was shown in Point I, infra, 
articles of incorporation, although they are "filed" 
with the Secretary of State's Office, become a matter of 
public record after they are filed. It is a matter of 
common knowledge that forging signatures upon a document 
which becomes a public record is a culpable act. Further, 
-11-
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even if appellant had actually relied on the distinction 
between "filing" and "recording" delineated in Point I 
of his appellate brief, to conclude that his actions did 
not fall within the statute, such reliance would have 
been unreasonable and as in Perez, supra, would have 
constituted a deliberate choice to approach the area of 
prohibited conduct and an assumption of the risk of 
crossing the line. Thus, as it applies to appellant in 
the case at bar, Section 76-6-503 is not unconstitutionally 
vague. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CGr1MIT 
ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 1-iOTION FOR 
A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
At the close of the respondent's case-in-chief 
at trial, appellant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal 
on the ground that respondent failed to make a prima facie 
case in failing to prove an intent to deceive or injure 
others on the part of appellant (R.223). Judge Croft ruled 
that the respondent had proved that appellant forged 
signatures on the articles of incorporation before filing 
them and that the inference from this conduct is that 
appellant intended to deceive people (R.226). 
The standard to be applied in determining when 
the trial court has a duty to direct a verdict of acquittal 
is stated in 75 Am.Jur.2d 543, Trial § 553: 
-12-
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In a criminal case it is the 
duty of the trial court to direct an 
acquittal where there is no substantial 
evidence of the guilt of the accused. 
It has been held that the court cannot 
refuse to direct a verdict of acquittal 
where there is no evidence reasonably 
tending to prove that the offense was 
committed, where the defendant is 
clearly not guilty, where the only 
evidence against the defendant is 
incompetent, where there is no competent 
evidence to sustain a conviction, or where 
the evidence wholly fails to connect the 
defendant with the commission of the crime, 
or creates a mere suspicion of guilt, or is 
not sufficient to warrant a reasonable 
conclusion of guilt. 
It is further stated in 75 Am.Jur.2d 544, Trial § 553, that: 
There is no duty on the part of the 
court to direct an acquittal where there 
is sufficient evidence to warrant the 
jury's believing beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant is guilty, or where there 
is substantial evidence from which guilt 
may legitimately be found. 
This Court has adopted the later test in its decisions 
specifically addressing the issue of when it is proper for 
the trial court to direct a verdict of acquittal. In 
State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 272 P.2d 195 (1954), 
the Court upheld a conviction of second degree murder in 
spite of a challenge to the trial court's failure to direct 
acquittal. The Court there wrote: 
-13-
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It has been repeatedly held by 
this court that upon a motion to 
dismiss or to direct a verdict of not 
guilty for lack of evidence that 
the trial court does not consider the 
weight of the evidence or credibility 
of the witnesses, but determines the 
naked legal proposition of law, whether 
there is any substantial evidence of 
the guilt of the accused, and all 
reasonable inferences are to be taken 
in favor of the state ••. [I)f there 
is before the court evidence upon which 
reasonable men might differ as to 
whether the defendant is or is not 
guilty, he may deny the motion. 
272 P.2d 195, 198. See also State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 
95, 355 P.2d 689 (1960); State v. Woodall, 6 Utah 2d 8, 305 
P.2d 473 (1956); and State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 
P.2d 57 (1960). Further, in State v. Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 
240 P.2d 504 (1952), this Court held that there can be no 
error in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal where there 
is competent evidence from which the jury could find beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime 
charged. 
Respondent submits that in the case at bar, there 
was sufficient competent evidence adduced at trial from 
which the jury could find appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
In the case of State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 
1976) , this Court established the burden which the prosecu-
tion must bear to establish a prima facie case: 
-14-
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In order to submit a question to the 
jury it is necessary that the prosecution 
establish a prima facie case. That is, it 
is necessary to present some evidence of 
every element needed to make out a cause 
of action, and it has long been established 
that such may be proven by direct and by 
circumstantial evidence. But the evidence 
required need be only that which is sufficient 
to conform to the statutory definition of the 
crime charged, and the "element of each 
offense" is defined as (a) conduct, attendant 
circumstances, or results of conduct; and (b) 
the requisite mental state. 
554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976). The elements of Section 76-6-503 
are: (a) the actus reus of falsifying, destroying, removing 
or concealing a writing for which the law provides public 
recording; and (b) the mens rea is an intent to deceive or 
injury anyone. 
Appellant did not challenge at trial the 
fact that he did forge or "falsify" the signatures on 
the articles of incorporation (R.228). Indeed, this fact 
was established by a defense witness, Ireva Petty Ozawa, 
on direct examination (R.3ll). Thus, the "conduct" 
element of the crime was made out beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
In addition to the inference to be drawn from 
appellant's conduct of filing articles of incorporation 
with forged signatures that appellant intended to deceive 
people, the state also produced evidence of a specific 
-15-
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attempt to deceive a person with whom appellant dealt. 
Kenneth Don Nelson, the manager of the Bay City Auto 
Auction in California was told by appellant that Nordell 
Financial Services was a "group of local businessmen" 
with whom appellant had no connection (R.380-382). 
Appellant even denied knowing who Fawn Noren, his 
mother, was (R.382). 
When this conduct is viewed against the 
backdrop of Nordell being unable to pay for drafts, 
owing Mr. Nelson at the time over $70,000, the intent 
of appellant to conceal the fact that Nordell was 
incorporated and operated by the same persons that 
operated vlorld of Autos is apparent. Further, Ireva 
Petty Ozawa testified that World of Autos was having 
financial difficulty even before the articles of 
incorporation for Nordell were filed (R.342). Finally, 
appellant told Ray Bishop to misrepresent to car dealers 
from whor.t he bought cars that Horld of Autos had been 
dealing with Nordell Financial Services for one and one 
half years soon after Nordell was formed (R.l44). The 
evidence viewed collectively shows beyond a reasonable 
doubt that by forging the signatures of others on the 
articles of incorporation but not signing the articles 
himself, appellant intended to deceive others with whom 
-16-
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he dealt into thinking that Nordell Financial Services 
and World of Autos were functionally separate businesses. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument and authority, 
respondent respectfully submits that the conviction and 
sentence of the appellant were proper and should be 
affirmed by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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